Generalized Cav(u) Theorem for Repeated Games with One-sided Incomplete Information

Volume 6, Issue 3, June 2021     |     PP. 33-43      |     PDF (318 K)    |     Pub. Date: July 28, 2021
DOI: 10.54647/mathematics11275    74 Downloads     5692 Views  

Author(s)

Weicheng Xu, School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China; Institute of Marine Development, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China
Zhendong Zhang, School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China
Xiaoyi Feng, School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China

Abstract
This study was devoted to extend Cav(u) theorem for repeated games with one-sided incomplete information. The model considered in this paper was based on the typical Aumann-Maschler model. According to the properties of Wasserstein distance, the Cav(u) theorem for repeated games with one-sided incomplete information was generalized from convex and compact subset to the whole space. And an approximation method was provided for dealing with the problem of probability measurement in the whole space.

Keywords
One-sided incomplete information; Repeated game; Cav(u) theorem; Wasserstein distance

Cite this paper
Weicheng Xu, Zhendong Zhang, Xiaoyi Feng, Generalized Cav(u) Theorem for Repeated Games with One-sided Incomplete Information , SCIREA Journal of Mathematics. Volume 6, Issue 3, June 2021 | PP. 33-43. 10.54647/mathematics11275

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